How Many Pandemics Will it Take Before the Paradigm Shifts?

Hindsight is 20/202: Instead of worldwide protests against gain-of-function biological research of the kind thought to have contributed to the novel coronavirus, 2020 saw protests over police brutality (George Floyd/BLM). Fast forward to 2026 and once again infectious disease outbreaks are dominating the headlines: Ebola. Hantavirus. And now? Pneumonic plague!

Since we did not do a fantastic job handling the previous pandemic, this is as good of a reminder as we are likely to get before the next one: Rather than allowing normalcy bias (denial) to call the shots, the precautionary principle ought to prevail when it comes time to decide how best to respond.

And yet here we go again: After early Russian media reporting that suggested a Siberian lab worker’s death may have been connected to a lab accident involving a broken test tube, the Russian government has walked it back. Where have we seen this before? Chinese authorities in the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak. And the U.S. authorities who attempted to downplay taxpayer funding of coronavirus research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology by way of EcoHealth Alliance.

If this is nothing, “Thank God we got lucky!” will suffice. If it is something, Russia is costing the international health community time it does not have to prepare.

All too often, the urge to prevent public panic seemingly outpaces the confidence level necessary for public health officials to act decisively and swiftly on the best available information.

Arguably, it time to flip that script on its head.

For public policy purposes, until proven otherwise, all “lab accidents” — if not also mystery illnesses in proximity to BSL-4 labs — are gain-of-function chimeras.

Were the above the default assumption, it would inform critical response decisions downstream. Most notably, it would challenge the assumption that conventional treatments will work. It also means that the time for international travel bans and quarantines are when outbreaks are still incredibly small — in sharp contrast to the nonsensical COVID-era assumption that one can “slow the spread” after cases have appeared all over the world.

Public expectations are downstream of public policy. That, too, should reflect the realities of our time.

To date, we have not seen anything but so-called imperfect or leaky vaccines developed to counter gain-of-function (genetically amplified) illnesses. Rightly or wrongly, the fact that mRNA products do not stop the spread — or result in population-wide herd immunity — bastardizes the definition of a “vaccine” in the public mind. Consequently, mRNA products should be promoted consistent with their original use — as therapeutics. If not, whatever vaccine skepticism we saw during COVID-19 will only escalate as a product of a public that A) is frustrated by public health promises that outstrip data and/or lived experience, or worse B) blames vaccines for causing illnesses they are unable to cure (a rampant perception, for example, in Ebola-prone Western Africa).

The public policy takeaway from the COVID-19 pandemic? Call balls and strikes. Nothing more. Nothing less.

If and when the world faces another pandemic, chances are it will be worse than the <5% case fatality rate of COVID-19. We already know what damage the novel coronavirus did to education, timely access to healthcare for other preventable causes of death, PPE access for healthcare workers, supply chain breakdown, small businesses, non-essential workers, inflation and other fronts.

The world can’t afford a repeat, with far steeper consequences.

With more than 1.1 million Americans lost to the COVID-19 pandemic by 2023 — cementing the U.S. in the history books as a top loss leader globally! — it would be understandable to assume legal reforms are already on the books in the aftermath. However, current gain-of-function policy relies, instead, on Executive Order 14292, signed by President Trump in May 2025. The penalties for defying presidential policy prohibiting this research are therefore financial, not criminal, in nature.

A proposed law introduced in March 2025 by Senator Rand Paul [R-KY] and Rep. Morgan Griffith [R-VA09] (S.854) sought to strip the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of its final grant approval authority for high-risk biological studies, but failed to pass. The Risky Research Review Act would have established an independent, nine-member “Life Sciences Research Security Board” to oversee and approve all federal funding for gain-of-function and other high-risk pathogen research. To date, however, the U.S. does have formal statutory laws passed by Congress that touch on this field. Only the materials used, rather than specific genetic experiments, are regulated as of Fall 2026.

Because nothing has been put into law, whether taxpayer dollars are again used to fund gain-of-function research is subject to the policy whims of future administrations.

Adding to the ambivalence, some scientists argue that essentially all forms of biological research are “gain of function”. Policymakers, however, point to a more narrowly tailored definition, called Gain-of-Function Research of Concern (GOFROC):

Efforts to study and/or predict the natural evolution and emergence of pathogenic microbes by deliberately creating, in the laboratory, pathogens with enhanced disease-causing or transmission-promoting properties. This includes studies that involve enhancing the pathogenicity, transmissibility, or host range of a potential pandemic pathogen. —Congressional Research Service

In May 2024, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and federal agencies stopped using the vague “gain-of-function” term in formal policy. Under the current unified federal oversight framework, they officially classify it as a Pathogen with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP) in recognition of the fact that so-called Dual Use Research of Concern (military/civilian) uses and enhanced potential pandemic pathogen oversight frameworks overlap.

The effort highlights the need for additional scrutiny and stronger partnerships with institutions to facilitate review and oversight — but much like the Big Tech argument that AI superintelligence warrants international cooperation, it does not go far enough.

In a more prescient world, whether we call it GoF, GOFROC or PEPP, such research would be subject to an international moratorium. After all, 30+ years of deliberately enhancing the virulence of already highly pathogenic diseases has never produced truly impressive (proportionate to risk) countermeasures. Consequently, we can ill afford a public health response that, in the critical early stages of an outbreak, would rather weigh optics than the cost, in both money and trust, of bringing entire countries to a screeching halt.

If the stakes were limited to losses of life and devastating economic blows, it would be nightmarish enough. But a socially toxic environment, where minority voices find themselves shamed, shunned, isolated, censored or even terminated from their jobs, are also end results of early outbreak mismanagement.

Recall from the early COVID-19 response Trump administration travel bans were derided as “xenophobic“. All the while, “quarantined” passengers disembarking from cruise ships were allowed to board flights or shuttled to secondary locations, often with the blessing of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention who in turn succumbed to the complex interplay between state and federal agencies, among them Health and Human Services (HHS) and the State Department.

While “no risk above zero is an acceptable risk” for pathogens that are orders of magnitude more deadly than COVID-19 may be a self-evident truth to the layperson, the infectious disease community is confident they have trained for such scenarios and can go about moving patients to sources of care rather than bringing the source of care to sick patients.

This pattern of hubris repeats with every outbreak:

  • An Andes Hantavirus outbreak on a South American cruise ship earlier this year resulted in international passengers sent home for monitoring, despite the fact that they contracted the only known strain with the potential to pass person-to-person. While experts questioned where the CDC was per AP reporting, public health stakeholders essentially congratulated themselves for improved public messaging. The lowest risk approach — quarantine aboard a luxury vessel — was called “inhumane” in no less than the The New England Journal of Medicine.
  • Ebola-infected healthcare workers have been moved from Africa to Germany and the Netherlands for treatment. Far from being an exception to the rule, reports of “quarantine relocation” date back 10+ years.
  • The Russian lab worker who died on October 2 after becoming infected in late September was admitted to a local hospital. No doubt COVID-19’s emergence in China also began with “Patient Zero” seeking care within the community, irrespective of the fact that a lab worker might be reasonably expected to account for the fact that their occupational hazards should preclude placing the broader public at risk.

If we are being completely honest, it represents a break in “quarantine” when patients are moved — even if the destination is an isolation ward in a community hospital. Yet in the age of antibiotics and antivirals, imposing the level of isolation necessary to ward off a mass contagion does not carry the urgency it did in the distant past.

The discovery of a tuberculosis case among immigrants swarming the shores of Ellis Island, a yellow-fever ravaged ship bound for European shores, forced to spend 40 days anchored to a remote rock outcropping — maritime quarantine stations known as “lazarettos” — or an ancient leprosy colony, quarantine was among one of the few effective public health measures. By contrast, when modern authorities attempt to impose quarantines, they operate under legal and public expectation of human rights that did not exist a century ago.

By defining the modern quarantine primarily as a “humanitarian duty to the individual,” public health agencies rationalize systemic risks to global biosecurity. This creates a recurring policy loop where health authorities would rather risk a potentially devastating domestic spillover than create a comprehensive response infrastructure to treat patients in place.

In this way, the modern public health establishment moved from “inhumanity” to the individual to cruelty to the collective: Instead of quarantining the few, the COVID-19 pandemic ushered in the first-ever effort to lockdown the many.

To be clear: Per the World Health Organization (WHO). Russian officials formally notified them that no case of plague has been recorded in Irkutsk, site of the Anti-Plague Institute of Siberia and the Far East. Moreover, even if Pneumonic plague was the cause of the lab worker’s death, it does not mean the illness will pose more than a regional threat. Additionally, a Pnuemonic plague mRNA therapeutic has been in an Israeli research pipeline for over a year. Still, it would be remiss to dismiss a valuable reminder:

The best time to act is before the next pandemic. And the best working assumption to make, is not “if” but “when”.

If Russia succeeds in containing this “mystery pneumonia”, the worst that will happen is that we look back and roll our eyes at an overreaction. If they fail, what’s coming, if subject to gain of function amplification, may be matched only by the Black Death in the Middle Ages in virulence.

Which should we roll the dice on — inconvenience when there is still little to worry about and very few people impacted? Or widespread and prolonged lockdowns when it is too little too late?

Thanks to Chinese face saving, an apparent coverup on the part of Dr. Anthony Fauci’s enablers at the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Disease, and the affront quarantine represents to modern sensibilities, the global health community was unprepared to do what was necessary to stop the spread of COVID-19 in its earliest stages. End result? A years-long marathon of government mandates. Public health demands imposed on the general public. And a virus that is now endemic.

A repeat only six years later in the event Russia is no more transparent? Unacceptable!

Let’s hope this time governments are not willing to inflict such a steep price out of fear that telling the truth on Day One might scare us.

###

SOURCES

Nearly 200 People Under Observation After Irkutsk Lab Worker Dies From Plague | Moscow Times

Russian ‘Plague’ Update: Experts Warn of Possible Biological Agent | TIME

Russia Approved Secret China Military Training at Top Level, Sources Say | Reuters/The Japanese Times

Israeli Scientists Develop First mRNA Vaccine Against Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria | The Life Sciences Magazine

Gain-of-Function Research: Balancing Science and Security | Hopkins Bloomberg Public Health

Quarantine Throughout History | Encyclopedia of Public Health (NIH/PubMed)

CIA whistleblower alleges COVID lab-leak findings were suppressed by agency | U.S. Right to Know

Experimental Vaccines Had Surprise Side Effect During Ebola Outbreak. Fauci Panicked | Daily Caller Foundation

Some Vaccines Support Evolution of more-Virulent Viruses | PennState Research (2015)

Gabbard Reveals Declassified Map, Records of Ukraine Bio Labs—View in Full | Newsweek

Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease? | Arms Control Today (2005)

Biolabs in Your Backyard | USA Today Investigative Series (2015):

This content is blocked because it requires marketing cookies.

Leave a Reply